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Abstract The tax depreciation decision potentially has significant impact on the
profitability of firms and projects. Indeed, the depreciation method chosen for tax
purposes affects the timing of tax payments, and, as a consequence, it also affects
the after-tax net present value of investment projects. Previous research focusses on
the optimal choice of depreciation method under the assumption that the deprecia-
tion method has to be set ex ante and cannot be changed during the useful life of the
asset. However, several countries allow changes of depreciation method under certain
circumstances. This paper develops a dynamic programming approach to determine
the firm’s optimal choice with regard to the initial depreciation method, and whether
changes of method are proposed in later periods.
Keywords Tax depreciation · Net present value · Dynamic programming
1 Introduction
To determine a firm’s taxable income, cash flows are reduced with depreciation charges
that reflect the decrease in economic value of the firm’s assets. For practical purposes,
a number of standardized depreciation methods have been designed. While certain
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countries mandate the use of a specific depreciation method, such as, e.g., Germany,
other countries allow some flexibility.1 Examples of countries that allow flexibility
include the US and the Netherlands. In the US, the tax authority allows firms to choose
between the straight line depreciation method (SDM), which divides the asset value
equally over the useful life of the asset, and a specified accelerated method, which
assigns higher depreciation charges to earlier periods (see, e.g., U.S. Department of
the Treasury 2008). In the Netherlands, the tax authority allows significant flexibility
in the choice of depreciation scheme for start-up firms, and recently expanded this
flexibility to stimulate investments in the current economic downturn. Specifically,
it allows for any arbitrary accelerated depreciation scheme as long as the amount
depreciated in a given year does not exceed 50% of the initial asset value.2
The choice of depreciation method potentially has important consequences. Indeed,
since the depreciation method affects the timing of tax payments, it affects the net pres-
ent value of the firm’s after-tax revenues. Existing literature shows that tax deprecia-
tion can significantly affect the value of the firm and its investment behavior (see, e.g.,
Arkin and Slastnikov 2007; De Waegenaere et al. 2003; Sansing 1998; Wielhouwer
et al. 2000).
The focus in our paper is on the choice of depreciation strategy that minimizes the
expected present value of tax payments. The early literature on optimal tax depreci-
ation (see, e.g., Davidson and Drake 1961, 1964; Roemmich et al. 1978; Wakeman
1980) assumes that the cash flow in every future period is high enough to cover the
highest possible depreciation charge in that period. Then, it is optimal to choose the
most accelerated depreciation method. The reason is that due to the time value of
money, a dollar of tax paid this year decreases firm value to a larger extent than a
dollar of tax paid in a later year. Therefore, it is optimal to depreciate as much as
possible as early as possible, but never more than the cash flow in the corresponding
period. A summary of the early literature can be found in Rueckle (1983). More recent
literature extends the early work by allowing for uncertain future cash flows, reinvest-
ments, and/or progressive tax structures, and shows that it is no longer necessarily the
case that the most accelerated method is preferred (Berg et al. 2001; Berg and Moore
1989; De Waegenaere and Wielhouwer 2002; Dedner et al. 1980; Kromschroder 1984;
Kunkel 1992; Wielhouwer et al. 2002).
The above described literature assumes that the depreciation method has to be set
ex ante and cannot be changed during the lifetime of the asset. In countries where
the tax authority allows some flexibility with regard to the choice of method, firms
typically also have the option to request a change of method. In the Netherlands, for
example, changes of depreciation method are typically allowed if they can be moti-
vated on the basis of the economic depreciation in value of the asset. It is intuitively
clear that the option to change depreciation method can reduce the expected present
value of tax payments significantly. Ignoring this option value might imply that the
firm underestimates the after-tax net present value (NPV) of investment projects by
1 At present, Germany temporarily allows using a more accelerated depreciation method for tax purposes
due to the current financial crisis.
2 Source: http://www.kvk.nl/belastingen/.
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overestimating the expected tax payments (or by requiring a pre-tax rate of return that
is too high). Our goal in this paper is therefore to determine the firm’s optimal strategy
with regard to the choice of depreciation method in the year of acquisition of an asset,
and whether or not a change of method is proposed in later years. Since, as argued
above, firms typically need to have an accurate motivation for a proposed change, we
consider a model where there exists a positive probability that the tax authority will
not accept the proposal.3 We allow this probability to depend on whether changes
were proposed in earlier periods, and whether they were accepted.
We formulate the firm’s decision problem as a dynamic optimization problem, and
determine recursive relationships for the corresponding value functions. Then, we use
these recursive relationships to investigate the effect of discounting (i.e., the time value
of money) on the optimal depreciation strategy. We show that, as in the static setting
considered in Berg et al. (2001), stronger discounting (i.e., a lower discount factor)
works in favor of more accelerated methods. We then first numerically illustrate the
basic tradeoffs that occur in settings without carry over of losses. We show that, even
when changes are not accepted with certainty, it may be optimal for the firm to start
off with a method that is suboptimal if future changes are not allowed, and propose a
change later on. We find that the value of the option to change depreciation method
(in terms of percentage reduction in expected discounted tax payments) can be signif-
icant, and depends on the discount factor, the cash flow patterns, and the probability
that proposed changes are accepted.
Next, we extend our model to investigate the effect of the possibility to carry over
losses to future periods on the value of the option to change depreciation method. It
is well-known that the option to carry over losses decreases the present value of tax
payments, and that if losses can compensate profits over the whole depreciable life of
the asset, it is always optimal to use the most accelerated method. However, when the
number of years that losses can be carried forward is limited, it is not necessarily the
case that the most accelerated method is optimal (see Berg et al. 2001). This suggests
that the option to change depreciation method can also be valuable in these settings.
We, therefore, extend our model to include the possibility of carry over of losses, and
derive the corresponding recursive relationship for the value function. We then use this
recursive relationship to numerically illustrate the effect of carry over possibilities on
the value of the option to change depreciation method. We find that carry over possi-
bilities can increase the value of the option to change depreciation method compared
to settings where carry over of losses is not allowed. This occurs because allowing
carry forward may make it optimal to exercise the valuable option earlier.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the optimiza-
tion problem. Section 3 reformulates the problem as a dynamic optimization problem.
Section 4 deals with the effect of discounting on the optimal solution. Section 5 gives
a numerical analysis. In Sect. 6 we show how the model can be extended to include
carry forward of losses, and provide a numerical illustration of the effect of the option
3 IRS Publication 946 states: “Generally, you must get IRS approval to change your method of accounting.
You generally must file Form 3115, Application for Change in Accounting Method, to request a change in
your method of accounting for depreciation”.
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to change depreciation method in this setting. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are
deferred to the Appendix.
2 The model
A firm has an asset of value D0 at time 0, which can be depreciated for tax pur-
poses over a maximum of N periods.4 The depreciation charge in period i reflects the
reported decrease in value of the asset during that period. We formally distinguish a
depreciation method and a depreciation scheme.
Definition 1
– A depreciation scheme for an asset of value D0 consists of a vector d =
(d1, . . . , dN ) ∈ RN+ for some N that satisfies
N∑
i=1
di = D0. (1)
– A depreciation method M is represented by a function fM (·, ·) : N × N →[0, 1]
that satisfies
N∑
i=1
fM (i, N ) = 1, for all N . (2)
When depreciation method M is used throughout the depreciable life of an asset
with initial value D0, the corresponding depreciation scheme is given by
di = fM (i, N ) · D0, for all i = 1, . . . , N .
In this paper, we focus on depreciation schemes that result from either using a
particular depreciation method throughout the useful life of the asset, or from using a
combination of depreciation methods. An example of a commonly used depreciation
method is the straight line depreciation method (SDM), which divides the depreciation
charges equally over the depreciable life of the asset, i.e.,
fSDM(i, N ) = 1N , for i = 1, . . . , N . (3)
In contrast, the sum of the years’ digits method (SYD) is an accelerated method in the
sense that the depreciation charges decrease over time. Specifically,
fSYD(i, N ) = 2(N−i+1)N (N+1) , for i = 1, ..., N . (4)
4 In case the salvage value of the asset is positive at the end of period N , D0 represents the initial value
reduced with the salvage value. For simplicity, however, we refer to D0 as the initial value of the asset.
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Another example of an accelerated method is the double declining balance method
(DDB). Under this method, a constant fraction of the residual tax base is depreciated in
each year, where the residual tax base is equal to the original asset value reduced with
prior depreciation charges. Because the fraction is twice the fraction under SDM, i.e.,
2
N , the method requires a depreciable lifetime of N ≥ 2 periods, and the corresponding
depreciation fractions (as fraction of the original asset value) are given by:
fDDB(i, N ) = 2N , for i = 1,
= 2N
(
1 − 2N
)i−1
, for i = 2, . . . , N − 1,
= (1 − 2N
)N−1
, for i = N .
(5)
Finally, our model allows for depreciation methods under which the tax base of the
asset is reduced to zero before the end of the economic life of the asset, i.e., where
fM (i, N ) = 0 for i = j + 1, . . . , N , for some j < N . An example of such a method
is an immediate write-off, which is represented by:
f I (i, N ) = 1, for i = 1,
= 0, for i = 2, . . . , N .
As taxable income equals cash flow minus depreciation charges, the choice of
depreciation scheme potentially has important consequences for tax payments. We
consider a firm that wants to determine the depreciation strategy that maximizes the
expected present value of future after-tax cash flows. For expositional purposes, we
first abstract from carry over possibilities (compensating taxable profits with losses
in earlier years, or losses with profits in earlier years). In Sect. 6, we show how the
model can be extended to include carry forward of losses.5
If the cash flow in a given year exceeds the depreciation charge for that year, so that
taxable income is positive, then taxes are paid on the difference between the cash flow
and the depreciation charge. If the cash flow is lower than the depreciation charge,
taxable income is negative, and no taxes are paid. Now let α(i) = 1
(1+r (i))i , where r
(i)
denotes the net rate of return required by shareholders. Then, the expected present
value of future after-tax cash flows is given by:
N∑
i=1
α(i)E
[
Ci − τ(Ci − di )+
]
,
where Ci denotes the random cash flow in year i , di denotes the depreciation charge
in year i , (Ci − di )+ = max{Ci − di , 0}, and τ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the tax rate. Clearly,
maximizing the expected present value of after-tax cash flows is equivalent to
5 Earlier research (e.g. Berg et al. 2001) shows that, as long as the number of years that losses can be
carried forward is limited, carry over possibilities do not significantly affect the qualitative results, although
quantitative results may indeed change. In Sect. 6 we show that limited carry over possibilities can increase
the value of the option to change depreciation method.
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minimizing the expected present value of future tax payments, which is given by:
τ
N∑
i=1
α(i)E
[
(Ci − di )+
]
. (6)
The existing literature focuses on the choice of depreciation method that minimizes
(6) over a given set of acceptable depreciation methods, under the assumption that the
depreciation method is chosen at date zero, and never changed afterwards. As stated
in Sect. 1, however, firms typically have the possibility to propose a change of depre-
ciation method in later periods. This implies that, in addition to choosing the initial
depreciation method, the firm has to decide whether or not a change is proposed at the
beginning of periods i = 2, . . . , N . Our goal in this paper is to determine the firm’s
optimal strategy with regard to the choice of depreciation method, and whether or not
changes are proposed.6 According to common practice, we consider a setting where
there are two acceptable depreciation methods, A and B, e.g., an accelerated method
and the straight line method, and we use the following notation:
Mc = B, if M = A,
= A, if M = B.
With two methods and a possible change in each period, there are at most 2N−1 possible
depreciation schemes. When there is no uncertainty regarding whether a proposal to
change will be accepted, the firm’s decision problem amounts to choosing the depreci-
ation method that minimizes (6) among a subset of these 2N−1 depreciation schemes.
The subset is determined by the tax authority’s policy with regard to acceptance of
changes. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 Suppose that the tax authority accepts the first proposal to change
method, and rejects all subsequent proposals. Then, there are 2N possible depre-
ciation schemes, resulting from using depreciation method M ∈ {A, B} in periods
i = 1, . . . , k, and method Mc in periods i = k + 1, . . . , N , for k = 1, . . . , N . The
corresponding depreciation charges are given by:
di = fM (i, N )D0, i = 1, . . . , k,
= fMc (i − k, N − k)Dk, i = k + 1, . . . , N ,
where D0 denotes the initial asset value, and Dk denotes the residual tax base at the
start of period k+1, i.e., the initial asset value reduced with prior depreciation charges.
In this paper, however, we consider a setting where there is uncertainty as to whether
a proposal will be accepted. As argued in Sect. 1, changes generally must be motivated
6 Note that when at least one acceptable depreciation method reduces the tax base of the asset to zero in
strictly less than N periods, as is the case for example for an immediate write-off, the firm can to some
extent affect the number of years over which the value of the asset is depreciated for tax purposes through
a choice/change of depreciation method.
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on the basis of the economic decrease in value of the asset. This implies that the tax
authority may refuse a change if it believes that the change is not well-motivated. In
addition, the probability that a proposal to change will be accepted in a given period
may also depend on whether the tax report is audited, and whether changes were pro-
posed/accepted in prior periods. The fact that proposals may not be accepted implies
that the firm optimally conditions its decision to propose a change on whether or not
changes were proposed in prior periods and whether they were accepted. The objec-
tive of the firm then is to minimize the sum of the expected discounted tax payments
through the following decision variables:
(i) the choice of the initial depreciation method M, and
(ii) the choice whether or not to propose a change in period i , depending on whether
or not changes were proposed in prior periods and whether they were accepted.
Now let, for any given period i , a decision node j represent one possible scenario
with respect to whether changes were proposed in prior periods, and whether they were
accepted. Since in each period either no change is proposed, a change is proposed, but
not accepted, or a change is proposed and accepted, there are 3i−2 decision nodes in
period i . We, therefore, introduce the decision variables:
M ∈ {A, B} = the initial depreciation method,
and, for every i = 2, . . . , N , and j = 1, . . . , 3i−2,
ξi, j = 0, if no change is proposed in period i, decision node j;
= 1, if a change is proposed in period i, decision node j, (7)
and the random variables:
φi, j = 0, if ξi, j = 0;
= 0, if ξi, j = 1, and the proposed change is rejected;
= 1, if ξi, j = 1, and the proposed change is accepted.
(8)
We are now ready to formulate the optimization problem. First, it is clear that if
the firm’s decision in period i depends on whether changes were proposed and/or
accepted in prior periods, uncertainty regarding acceptance of proposals implies that
the depreciation charge that will be applied in a given period, as well as whether a
change will be proposed are random variables that depend on the initial choice M and
the change strategy ξ . Specifically, for any given (M, ξ), we denote
– di (M, ξ) for the random variable that yields the depreciation charge in period i,
for i = 1, . . . , N ;
– ξ i (M, ξ) for the random variable that equals 1 if a change is proposed at the
beginning of period i , and 0 otherwise, for i = 2, . . . , N .
Then, the amount of tax to be paid at the end of period i equals τ(Ci −di (M, ξ))+.
The optimal initial choice M and the optimal change strategy ξ therefore solve the
following optimization problem:
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min τ
N∑
i=1
α(i)E[(Ci − di (M, ξ))+]
s.t.
{
M ∈ {A, B}
ξi ∈ {0, 1}3i−2 , for i = 2, . . . , N .
(9)
Since the optimal depreciation strategy is not affected by the tax rate, we divide the
objective function by τ , so that the expected present value of the tax base is minimized.
To solve the optimization problem, the probability distribution of di (M, ξ) for
i = 1, . . . , N as well as the probability distribution of ξ i (M, ξ) for i = 2, . . . , N ,
need to be determined for any given change strategy ξ , and any initial method M .
These probability distributions depend on how the probability of acceptance of a pro-
posal depends on whether proposals were made in earlier periods, and whether they
were accepted.
The following proposition considers the case where at most one proposal will be
accepted. First, we introduce some notation. Without loss of generality, we let decision
node (i, 1) represent the unique node in period i in which no changes were proposed in
prior periods. Moreover, let d(M,k), k = 1, . . . , N , represent the depreciation scheme
that results from using method M ∈ {A, B} in periods i = 1, . . . , k, and using method
Mc in periods k + 1, . . . , N .
Proposition 1 Consider a setting where, as long as no prior proposal has been
accepted, the probability that a proposal will be accepted is constant and equal to p. As
soon as a prior proposal has been accepted, all future proposals will be rejected. Then,
under the optimal strategy, the probability distribution of the resulting depreciation
scheme is given by:
P(d(M, ξ) = d(M,k)) = ξk+1,1 · p · (1 − p)
∑k
j=2 ξ j,1 , k = 1, . . . , N − 1,
= (1 − p)
∑N
j=2 ξ j,1 , k = N ,
(10)
and the probability that a change is proposed at the beginning of period i is given by:
P(ξ i (M, ξ) = 1) = ξi,1 · (1 − p)
∑i−1
j=2 ξ j,1 . (11)
The above proposition shows that in the case where the probability of acceptance
is constant as long as no prior change has been accepted and drops to zero as soon as a
change has been accepted, the number of decision variables in optimization problem
(6) reduces from 1 + ∑Ni=2 3i−2 to N . The firm’s optimal strategy can then be found
by plugging in (10) and (11) in the objective function of optimization problem (9), and
determining the optimal value over all M ∈ {A, B}, and ξi,1 ∈ {0, 1} for i = 2, . . . , N .
We illustrate this in the following example.
Example 2 Consider an asset with a depreciable lifetime of 5 years, i.e., N = 5, and
an initial value of D0 = 5. The firm initially has the option to choose either SDM,
or SYD, and can propose a change of method in later periods. As long as no prior
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5
SDM
SYD
4
3.33
3
2
1
2.4
2.5
2
1.2
1.67
1.33
1
0.5
0.33
0.67
0.83
0.4
1.5 0.5
0.66
0
SYD
Fig. 1 Decision tree: in every decision node, the upper (lower) arrow corresponds to the use of SDM
(SYD); a straight arrow indicates that a change is no longer possible. In each node, the optimal (subopti-
mal) choice is indicated with a solid (dotted) arrow. The optimal trajectory is indicated with bold arrows.
The values at the nodes indicate the residual tax base in that node
proposal has been accepted, the probability that a proposal will be accepted is con-
stant and equal to p = 0.9. As soon as a prior proposal has been accepted, all future
proposals will be rejected. The decision tree is displayed in Fig. 1.
The only possible depreciation schemes are d(M,k), for M ∈ {SDM, SYD} and
k = 1, . . . , N , with depreciation charges given by:
d(M,k),i = fM (i, 5) · 5, i = 1, . . . , k,
= fMc (i − k, 5 − k)
(
5 −
k∑
j=1
d(M,k), j
)
, i = k + 1, . . . , 5.
Now, we let α(i) = αi with α = 0.95. The cash flow in period i = 1, . . . , 5 is normally
distributed with mean μi and standard deviation σi as given in the following table:
Period i 1 2 3 4 5
μi 1.5 1 2 3 0.5
σi 1 2 2 2 3
Without the possibility to change depreciation method, the expected discounted tax
payments using SDM and SYD are 5.36 and 5.34, respectively, so that SYD is the
preferable method. Allowing for the possibility to change, however, implies that it is
optimal to start with SDM, and propose a change of method in period 4. This strategy
reduces the expected present value of tax payments to 5.26.
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In the setting described in Proposition 1, it is possible to determine the probability
distribution of the depreciation charges in each period for any given strategy. In more
general cases, however, this becomes complicated. Then, an efficient method to solve
optimization problem (9) is dynamic programming. In Sect. 3, we therefore develop
a dynamic optimization approach to determine the firm’s optimal strategy.
3 Dynamic optimization
The basic idea of the dynamic optimization approach is to recursively determine the
value function in period i , for i = N , N − 1, . . . , 1. This value function yields the
minimal expected present value of the sum of tax payments in periods i, . . . , N ,
for any possible value of the state variables at the beginning of period i . Given the
analysis in the previous section, we let the state variables in period i be given by
si = (M1, ξ i−1, φi−1), where:
– M1 ∈ {A, B} denotes the method that is used in period 1;
– ξ i−1 = (ξ1, . . . , ξi−1) ∈ {0, 1}i−1 denotes whether a change was proposed at the
beginning of periods j = 1, . . . , i − 1;
– φi−1 = (φ1, . . . , φi−1) ∈ {0, 1}i−1 denotes whether a change was accepted in
periods j = 1, . . . , i − 1.
To determine the optimal decision at the start of period i for any given value of si ,
the following has to be known:
– the expected tax payments in period i , as a function of si and the decision at the
beginning of period i ;
– the probability distribution of si+1, as a function of si and the decision at the
beginning of period i .
It therefore remains to: (i) specify the probability distribution of the state variables,
and, (ii) show that (M1, ξ i−1, φi−1) is sufficient to determine the expected tax pay-
ments in period i . This will be dealt with in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Section
3.3 presents the recursive evaluation of the value functions.
3.1 Probability distribution of state variables
In period i = 1, there is no proposal to change, and so ξ1 = φ1 = 0. Therefore,
s2 = (M1, 0, 0) with probability 1. For periods i = 2, . . . , N , we let:
pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) = P(φi = 1|ξi = 1; ξ2, . . . , ξi−1;φ2, . . . , φi−1),
denote the probability that a proposed change will be accepted at the beginning of
period i , as a function of whether or not changes were proposed in periods prior to
period i (i.e., ξ2, . . . , ξi−1), and whether or not they were accepted (i.e., φ2, . . . , φi−1).
Now, given state variables si = (M1, ξ i−1, φi−1) at the beginning of period i , the
probability distribution of the state variables in period i + 1 depends on whether a
change is proposed at the beginning of period i . Specifically,
123
Dynamic tax depreciation strategies 429
– when no change is proposed, ξi = φi = 0, and so si+1 = (M1, (ξ i−1, 0), (φi−1, 0))
with probability 1;
– when a change is proposed, then ξi = 1, and two cases are possible: with
probability pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) the change is accepted (φi = 1), so that si+1 =
(M1, (ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 1)); with probability (1− pi (ξ i−1, φi−1)) it is not accepted
(φi = 0), so that si+1 = (M1, (ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 0)).
3.2 Expected tax payments
The following lemma shows that the depreciation charge to be used in period i when
method M is used in that period depends only on: the period i , the residual tax base
at the beginning of period i , and the last period before period i in which method M
was not used, which we denote by j − 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose method M is used in periods k = j, . . . , i −1, method Mc is used
in period j −1, and the residual tax base at the beginning of period i equals D. Then,
there exists a qi, j,N ∈ [0, 1] such that the depreciation charge to be used in period i
if method M is used is given by:
di = fM (i − j + 1, N − j + 1)
1 − ∑i− jk=1 fM (k, N − j + 1)
D
= qi, j,N · D.
Moreover, qN ,·,N = 1.
The above lemma shows that, for any given depreciation method, the fraction of
the residual tax base to be depreciated in period i is a function of the current period i ,
the useful life of the asset N , and the last period before period i in which the method
was not used (period j − 1). For example, it is easily verified that in case of SDM,
SYD, and DDB, as defined in (3), (4), and (5), respectively, the fractions qi, j,N are
given by:
qi, j,N ,SDM = 1N+1−i , for i = 1, . . . , N ,
qi, j,N ,SYD = 2N+2−i , for i = 1, . . . , N ,
qi, j,N ,DDB = 2N− j+1 , for i = 1, . . . , N − 1,
= 1, for i = N .
(12)
Note that in case of SDM and SYD, qi, j,N is independent of j . For notational conve-
nience, we restrict to depreciation methods for which the fraction of the residual tax
base to be depreciated in a given period i is independent of j .7 Moreover, since the
maximum depreciable lifetime of the asset N is given and fixed, we omit the index N ,
7 Allowing the fractions to depend on j increases notational complexity, but it does not otherwise affect
the results.
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and we denote qi,M := qi,·,N for the fraction of the residual tax base to be depreciated
in period i if method M is used. This yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For any given residual tax base D at the beginning of period i , the expected
tax to be paid in period i if method M is used in period i , is given by:
Tax(i, M, D) =
∞∫
qi,M ·D
(1 − Fi (x))dx,
where Fi (·) denotes the distribution function of the cash flow in period i .
It now remains to show that (M1, ξ i−1, φi−1) is sufficient to determine the expected
tax payments in period i for any possible decision. First, since a change of method
only occurs when ξi = 1 and φi = 1, it follows immediately that the method Mi used
in period i is determined recursively as follows:
M j = Mcj−1, if ξ j = 1 and φ j = 1,
= M j−1, otherwise, for j = i, . . . , 2. (13)
and, given Lemma 1, it follows that the residual tax base Di−1 at the beginning of
period i is determined recursively by:
D j =
(
1 − q j,A
) · D j−1, if M j = A,
= (1 − q j,B
) · D j−1, if M j = B, for j = i − 1, . . . , 1. (14)
where D0 denotes the initial asset value (initial depreciable amount).
Now let (M1, ξ i−1, φi−1) be a decision node in period i. Then,
– if no change is proposed at the beginning of period i , the expected tax payments
in period i are given by Tax(i, Mi−1, Di−1);
– if a change is proposed at the beginning of period i , then the expected tax payments
in period i are given by pi (ξ i−1, φi−1)·Tax(i, Mci−1, Di−1)+(1− pi (ξ i−1, φi−1))·
Tax(i, Mi−1, Di−1).
Therefore, expected tax payments in period i can be determined from (M1, ξ i−1,
φi−1), where Mi−1 and Di−1 follow from (13) and (14).
3.3 Recursive evaluation
While (M1, ξ i−1, φi−1) yields sufficient information to determine the optimal deci-
sion in period i , it follows from Lemma 2, (13) and (14), that it is convenient to use
the following, equivalent, set of state variables (M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1), where M denotes
the method that was used in period i − 1, and D denotes the residual tax base at the
end of period i − 1.
We now define the value functions as follows. The function
Vi (M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1) : {A, B} × R × {0, 1}i−1 × {0, 1}i−1 → R,
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for i = 2, . . . , N , yields the minimal expected present value of future tax payments
for periods i, . . . , N , given (M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1). The function
V1(D0) : R → R,
yields the minimal expected present value of future tax payments for all periods, as
a function of the initial value of the asset D0. The following proposition provides a
recursive relationship for the value functions, where
αi := α(i)/α(i−1) ∈ [0, 1],
denotes the value at date i − 1 of one unit at date i .
Proposition 2 Let:
VN+1(·, ·, ·, ·) := 0.
Then, for all i = 2, . . . , N,
Vi (M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1)
= min
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Tax(i, M, D) + αi · Vi+1(M, (1 − qi,M )D, (ξ i−1, 0), (φi−1, 0)),
pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) ·
[
Tax(i, Mc, D)+αi · Vi+1(Mc, (1−qi,Mc )D, (ξ i−1, 1),
(φi−1, 1))
]
+(1 − pi (ξ i−1, φi−1)) ·
[
Tax(i, M, D) + αi Vi+1(M, (1 − qi,M )D,
(ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 0))
]
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
,
and
V1(D) = min
M∈{A,B}
{
Tax(1, M, D) + α1 · V2(M, (1 − q1,M )D, 0, 0)
}
.
Note that the choice of ξi not only affects the depreciation method and the resid-
ual tax base in the next period, but also the probability that a future change will be
accepted. When no change is proposed in period i , the probability of acceptance in
the next period is given by pi+1((ξ i−1, 0), (φi−1, 0)); when a change is proposed and
accepted, it is given by pi+1((ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 1)); when a change is proposed, but not
accepted, it is given by pi+1((ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 0)).
The following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 It holds that:
i) It is optimal to choose method M in period 1 iff
Tax(1, M, D) + α1 · V2(M, (1 − q1,M )D, 0, 0)
≤ Tax(1, Mc, D) + α1 · V2(Mc, (1 − q1,Mc )D, 0, 0). (15)
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ii) In periods i = 2, . . . , N, a change should be proposed iff
pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) ·
[
Tax(i, M, D) − Tax(i, Mc, D)]
+αi · Si+1(M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1) ≥ 0,
where
Si+1(M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1) = Vi+1(M, (1 − qi,M )D, (ξ i−1, 0), (φi−1, 0))
−pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) · Vi+1(Mc, (1 − qi,Mc )D, (ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 1))
−(1 − pi (ξ i−1, φi−1)) · Vi+1(M, (1 − qi,M )D, (ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 0)).
(16)
The above corollary shows that it is optimal to propose a change in period i
iff the expected benefit from the proposal is positive. This expected benefit con-
sists of two parts: (i) the expected reduction in tax payments in period i , which is
equal to pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) ·
[
Tax(i, M, D) − Tax(i, Mc, D)], and (ii) the present value
of the expected reduction in tax payments in all future periods, which is given by
αi · Si+1(M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1). It is clear that the discount factor αi can play a crucial
role in whether or not it is optimal to propose a change. In Sect. 4, we investigate the
effect of discounting on the optimal decision in each period.
4 Effect of discounting
Berg et al. (2001) consider the case where α(i) = αi , for all i , and where a change of
method is never allowed. They then show that less discounting (a higher value of α)
works in favor of the least accelerated method. In our setting, however, a decision has
to be made in every period. We allow the discount factor to be different for different
periods, i.e., α(i) = α1 ·α2 · · · · ·αi = αi , and consider a method to be more accelerated
in period i if the depreciation charge in that period exceeds the depreciation charge
of the alternative method.
We now characterize the effect of discounting on optimal depreciation method
choice in settings where changes are allowed. First, it is clear that a proposal to change
depreciation method in the last period has no effect, because the depreciation charge
in the last period is always equal to the residual tax base. In the following proposition
we show that for all periods i = 1, . . . , N − 1, there exists a critical value of the
discount factor α˜i such that the most (least) accelerated method is optimal if αi < α˜i
(αi > α˜i ).
Proposition 3 For any given period i ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}, and state (M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1),
there exists a critical value α˜i ≤ 1 such that the most (least) accelerated method in
period i is preferable if αi < α˜i (αi > α˜i ).
The intuition that more discounting works in favor of more accelerated methods is
that these methods typically lower taxable income in earlier periods.
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5 Numerical illustration
In this section we illustrate the effect of the probability of acceptance and of the cash
flow distributions on the optimal initial choice, the expected present value of tax pay-
ments, and the value of the option to change depreciation method. Throughout this
section we consider a setting where:
– The acceptable depreciation methods are SDM and SY D, as defined in (12).
– The depreciable lifetime of the asset equals N = 10, and the initial amount to
depreciate equals D0 = 10.
– The discount factor in period i is given by αi = α = 0.95 for all i .
In Sect. 5.1 we consider given cash flow distributions, and investigate the effect of
the probability of acceptance of a proposal to change depreciation method. In Sect.
5.2 we investigate the effect of the cash flow distributions.
5.1 Effect of the probability of acceptance
We consider settings where the probability of acceptance of a proposal to change
depreciation method decreases with v · 100% after each accepted proposal. Then, for
a given change strategy ξ , the probability that a change proposed in period i will be
accepted is given by:
pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) = p, if ξ i−1 = (ξ1, . . . , ξi−1) = (0, . . . , 0), and
pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) = (1 − v)
i−1∑
k=1
φk
p, otherwise.
(17)
where p denotes the probability of acceptance of the first proposal. We first illustrate
the effect of p in the case where v = 0. Then, we investigate the effect of v for given
values of p.
In both cases, cash flows are normally distributed. The means and standard devia-
tions of the cash flow distributions are given in the following table:
Period i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E[Ci ] 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 0 2
σ [Ci ] 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
This reflects a setting where the variance is constant over the periods, but expected
income generated by the asset grows in early periods, and starts to decrease as of
period 8. The expected revenue in the last period may include the salvage value of the
asset at the end of its economic life.
When v = 0, the probability of acceptance is independent of earlier decisions, so
that:
pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) = p, for all i = 2, . . . , 10.
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The following table presents the minimum (over all possible change strategies) of the
expected present value of tax payments when the method applied in the first period
is SDM and SYD, respectively, for five different values of p. The optimal value is
indicated in bold. The third column presents the option value expressed as percentage
reduction in the expected present value of tax payments due to the possibility to change
depreciation method, i.e., compared to the case where p = 0.
p SDM SYD Option value (%)
0 14.28 14.10 0
0.3 13.97 14.10 0.9
0.5 13.92 14.09 1.3
0.8 13.87 14.05 1.6
1 13.85 14.03 1.8
Without the possibility to change the depreciation method, i.e., when p = 0, the
expected discounted tax payments equal 14.28 for SDM, and 14.10 for SYD, so that
SYD is the optimal method. In contrast, if changes are allowed with certainty, i.e.,
p = 1, then it is optimal to start with SDM, and propose changes of depreciation
method in later periods. Specifically, the optimal strategy would be to apply SDM
at the beginning, switch to SYD in period 4, and change to SDM again in period 9.
When the probability that a change will be accepted is relatively low (in this case
p < 0.1155), the expected benefit from being allowed to change depreciation method
does not outweigh the loss in case an anticipated change is not accepted. Therefore,
when p is low, the firm does not anticipate changes and chooses the method that is opti-
mal in case changes are not allowed. In contrast, when the probability of acceptance
of a proposal to change method is sufficiently large (i.e., p > 0.1155), it is optimal
for the firm to start off with the method that is suboptimal if no change is allowed,
and “bet” on acceptance of a change in a later period. Thus, the firm optimally starts
with SDM, and later on proposes a change to SYD. The option to change depreciation
method therefore is valuable whenever p > 0.1155.
The above example shows that the more accelerated method is the optimal ini-
tial choice only when the probability that a change will be accepted is relatively
low. We know from Proposition 9 that the choice between the accelerated and the
straight line method can also significantly depend on the discount factor. In Fig.
2, we illustrate how the optimal initial choice between SDM and SYD depends
on α and p. As expected, a stronger discounting effect, i.e., a lower discount fac-
tor increases the range of values of p for which the accelerated method is opti-
mal.
We now consider the case where v > 0, so that there is an opportunity cost asso-
ciated with proposing a change because it reduces the likelihood that a next proposal
will be accepted. The following table presents the minimum over all possible change
strategies of the expected present value of tax payments when the initial method is
SDM and SYD, respectively, for different values of v and p.
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0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
α
p
SYD
SDM
Fig. 2 The effect of α and p on the optimal initial depreciation method choice: SDM or SYD
v = 5% v = 20% v = 50% v =100%
p SDM SYD SDM SYD SDM SYD SDM SYD
0.5 13.92 14.09 13.93 14.09 13.93 14.09 13.94 14.09
1 13.85 14.03 13.86 14.05 13.87 14.08 13.88 14.08
Because the optimal strategy in case proposals are accepted with certainty (i.e., p = 1
and v = 0) involves multiple changes of depreciation method, a higher value of v
can affect the optimal strategy and the expected discounted tax payments, since it
implies that the likelihood that the second proposal will be accepted is lower. In all the
above cases, SDM is the optimal initial choice. The effect of decreasing probabilities
is relatively small in this example since the second change is only proposed in period
9, so that discounted benefits are relatively small.
5.2 Effect of cash flow patterns
In this section we numerically illustrate the effect of cash flow patterns on the optimal
initial choice, the expected present value of tax payments, and the value of the option
to change depreciation method. In order to investigate the effect of patterns in the
expected value as well as in the variance of future cash flows, we distinguish scenarios
with increasing, decreasing, and non-monotone patterns in expected cash flows, but
with constant variance, as well as scenarios with increasing and decreasing patterns
in variances, but constant expected cash flows. In each case, cash flows are normally
distributed.
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We first investigate the effect of patterns in the expected future cash flows, in settings
where the variance is constant over time, i.e., σi = σ for all i . Specifically, we define
the following four scenarios for the expected cash flows μi , for period i = 1, . . . , 10:
I: Increasing expected cash flows over time, with μi = 0.5 · i;
II: decreasing expected cash flows over time, with μi = 5.5 − 0.5 · i ;
III: increasing and subsequently decreasing expected cash flows, with {μ1, μ2, . . . ,
μ10} = {0, 1, 2.5, 4, 5, 5, 4, 2.5, 1, 0};
IV: decreasing and subsequently increasing expected cash flows, with {μ1, μ2, . . . ,
μ10} = {5, 4, 2.5, 1, 0, 0, 1, 2.5, 4, 5}.
In all four scenarios, the expected total cash flow over the economic life of the
asset, i.e.,
∑10
i=1 μi , is equal to 25. The following table presents the minimum over
all possible change strategies of the expected present value of tax payments when the
initial method is SDM and SY D, respectively. We consider settings where the vari-
ance is low (σ = 0.01), and where it is high (σ = 10), combined with settings where
a change of depreciation method is not allowed (i.e., p = 0), and where a change is
accepted with probability 70% (i.e., p = 0.7). The third column presents the option
value in case p = 0.7, expressed as percentage reduction in the expected present value
of tax payments due to the possibility to change depreciation method, i.e., compared
to the case where p = 0.
Scenario p σ = 0.01 σ = 10
SDM SYD Opt. value (%) SDM SYD Opt. value (%)
I 0 12.86 13.66 38.89 38.82
0.7 12.62 13.39 1.87 38.84 38.82 0
II 0 16.05 15.12 40.81 40.27
0.7 15.30 15.12 0 40.44 40.27 0
III 0 13.54 13.82 38.86 38.59
0.7 12.73 13.51 5.98 38.57 38.59 0.05
IV 0 13.77 13.39 39.01 38.66
0.7 13.33 12.92 3.51 38.84 38.63 0.08
As expected, the accelerated method (SYD) is optimal in the scenario with decreasing
expected cash flows (scenario II), and the expected present value of tax payments is
independent of p. The option to change therefore has no value if the initial choice
is optimal. However, it does reduce the expected tax payments in case a suboptimal
method is chosen initially. This holds for both values of σ . In contrast, for the scenario
with increasing expected cash flows (scenario I), the optimal initial choice depends on
the degree of uncertainty in future cash flows. When there is relatively little uncertainty
regarding the level of future cash flows (σ = 0.01), the optimal depreciation scheme
is SDM. This occurs because initial cash flows are likely to be low. Therefore, the
use of the accelerated method would lead to a too high probability of foregoing tax
deduction due to the depreciation charge being higher than the realized cash flow. It is
therefore optimal to start with SDM and propose a change to the accelerated method
in a later period. So even though there is relatively little uncertainty regarding the level
of future cash flows (i.e., σ is low), this option can be valuable. In this case, the option
to change depreciation method reduces the expected discounted tax payments with
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almost 2%. In contrast, if the variance is high (σ = 10), the probability that a cash
flow exceeds the corresponding depreciation charge is relatively similar for SDM and
SYD. Therefore, the optimal choice is SYD in this case. Note that the relatively high
level of expected taxable income in case of high variance is due to the fact that taxable
income is equal to income if positive.
Finally, with non-monotone patterns in the expected cash flows, i.e., in scenarios
III and IV, the option to change yields significant value. This occurs because both the
straight line and the accelerated method yield a relatively high probability of a loss
in tax deduction due to the fact that the depreciation charge exceeds the cash flow in
a certain period. The possibility to change depreciation method allows to reduce this
probability. In the case where σ = 0.01, the option reduces expected discounted tax
payments by 5.98% in scenario III, and by 3.51% in scenario IV.
We now investigate the effect of patterns in the degree of uncertainty in future cash
flows, as measured by the variance. Specifically, we let μi = 2 for all i = 1, . . . , 10,
and define the following two scenarios for σi :
V: Increasing variance with σi = 0.5 · i − 0.5, and
VI: decreasing variance with σi = 5 − 0.5 · i;
VII: decreasing and subsequently increasing variance,
with {σ1, σ2, . . . , σ10} = {5, 3, 1, 0.5, 0.01, 0.01, 0.5, 1, 3, 5}.
The following table presents the minimum over all possible change strategies of the
expected present value of tax payments when the initial method is SDM and SY D,
respectively, for the case where p = 0 and for the case where p = 0.7. The third
column presents the option value expressed as percentage reduction in the expected
present value of tax payments due to the possibility to change depreciation method,
i.e., compared to the case where p = 0.
Scenario p SDM SYD Option value (%)
V 0 11.90 10.96
0.7 11.41 10.96 0
VI 0 12.97 13.16
0.7 12.97 13.00 0
VII 0 11.90 11.62
0.7 11.42 11.56 1.72
The option to change depreciation method has no value in scenarios where the variance
is constant over time, i.e., scenarios V and V I , because it is then not optimal to change
depreciation method in a later period. The optimal initial choice is SYD in scenario
V, and SDM in scenario VI. High risk in the early years makes SDM optimal. This
occurs because the depreciation charge in the first year under the accelerated method
is only marginally smaller than the expected cash flow. This implies that when the var-
iance is high, there is a high probability that the firm foregoes some tax deduction. In
contrast, in scenario V I I the option to change depreciation method has value because
the decreasing and increasing pattern in the variances makes it optimal to start with
the straight line method and switch to the accelerated method later on.
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6 Effect of carry forward of losses
In this section we extend our analysis to allow for carry forward of losses.8 It is well-
known that in case carry forward is allowed over the whole depreciable life of the
asset, the most accelerated method is always optimal. However, this does not hold
when the number of years that losses can be carried forward to compensate profits in
later years is limited (see Berg et al. 2001). We first show how the model presented
in Sects. 3 and 4 can be extended to include the possibility to carry forward losses.
We then present a numerical example that shows that even though the possibility to
carry over losses to future periods reduces expected taxable income, the value of the
option to change depreciation method can remain significant, and can even increase
compared to settings where carry forward of losses is not allowed.
When carry forward of losses is allowed, the optimal decision in a given period is
likely to also depend on the amount of loss carry forward that is available to reduce
tax payments in future periods. For notational convenience we restrict to the case
where losses in period j can only be used to compensate profits in period j + 1. Let
us denote C F for the state variable that indicates the available loss carry forward at
the beginning of a period, and let us denote Vi (M, D, C F, ξ i−1, φi−1) for the value
function, i.e., the minimal expected present value of future tax payments in periods
i, . . . , N , in case method M was used in period i − 1, the residual tax base equals
D, the level of carry forward is given by C F , and prior proposals and acceptances of
changes are given by ξ i−1, and φi−1, respectively.
Let the state variables (M, D, C F, ξ i−1, φi−1) be given. In order to determine
a recursive relationship for the value function, we denote f (M, 0, 0) for the mini-
mal expected present value of tax payments in periods i, . . . , N in case no change
is proposed in period i , f (Mc, 1, 1) in case a change is proposed and accepted, and
f (M, 1, 0) in case a change is proposed, but not accepted. Then, because the amount
of loss that can be carried forward to period i + 1 in case method M is used in period
i equals
(
qi,M · D − Ci
)+
, it follows that the value function in period i is given by:
Vi (M, D, C F, ξ i−1, φi−1)
= min
{ f (M, 0, 0),
pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) · f (Mc, 1, 1) + (1 − pi (ξ i−1, φi−1)) · f (M, 1, 0}
}
,
where, for all s, v ∈ {0, 1}, and M ∈ {A, B},
f (M, s, v) = Tax(i, M, D, C F)
+αi · E
[
Vi+1
(
M, (1−qi,M )D,
(
qi,M D−Ci
)+
, (ξ i−1, s), (φi−1, v
)]
,
and Tax(i, M, D, C F) denotes the expected tax payments in period i . Because an
amount C F of prior losses can be used to compensate profits in period i , it follows
8 Several countries allow for alternative loss carryover possibilities like carry backward, i.e., compensat-
ing losses with profits in earlier years for tax purposes. We confine our attention to loss carry forward
possibilities.
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2 2.5 3 3.5
Without carry forward, changing not allowed
Without carry forward, changing allowed
With carry forward, changing not allowed
With carry forward, changing allowed
Expected Taxable Income
Fig. 3 The effect of carry forward and the option to change the depreciation method
from Lemma 2 that:
Tax(i, M, D, C F) =
∞∫
qi,M ·D+C F
(1 − Fi (x))dx .
We now illustrate the effect of carry forward on the option to change the deprecia-
tion method. Consider an asset with a depreciable lifetime of 5 years (N = 5), and an
initial value of D0 = 5. Let α be equal to 0.95. For each period, there are three possible
realizations of the cash flows, namely Ci = 0, 1, or 3. The probability distribution of
the cash flow in each of the 5 years is given in the following table.
Prob\Period i 1 2 3 4 5
P(Ci = 0) 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
P(Ci = 1) 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
P(Ci = 3) 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
We compare settings with and without the option to change method, and where either
carry forward is not allowed, or losses can be carried forward 1 year. Because expected
cash flows are relatively low in earlier years, the preferred initial method is SDM in
all four cases. Without carry forward and without the option to change, expected
discounted taxable income is 3.34 under SDM and 3.60 under SYD. Allowing one
period of carry forward reduces expected discounted taxable income to 2.50 and 2.54
for SDM and SYD, respectively. When a change of method is allowed with certainty,
i.e., p = 1, it is optimal to switch to the more accelerated method SYD during the
depreciable lifetime of the asset. This reduces the expected tax payments both in
settings with and without carry forward. However, the effect is stronger when carry
forward is allowed. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Without carry forward, the option to change depreciation method reduces expected
discounted taxable income for the optimal choice (SDM) by 0.6% (from 3.34 to 3.32).
When carry forward is allowed, it reduces the expected discounted taxable income by
5.2% (from 2.50 to 2.37). The intuition for the higher option value in case carry for-
ward is allowed is as follows. It can be verified that whereas when carry forward is
not allowed, the option to change is exercised after two periods, it is exercised after
one period if carry forward is allowed. This occurs because the depreciation charge
in the second period under the accelerated method is high compared to the expected
cash flow. Without carry forward, using the accelerated method in the second period
leads to a high probability of “loosing” tax deduction when the depreciation charge
exceeds the realized cash flow. When carry forward is allowed, however, the risk of
“loosing” some of the tax deduction reduces since it can be compensated in the next
period. Thus, by changing to the accelerated method earlier, the firm benefits from
a higher reduction in tax payments in the second period if cash flow turns out to be
high, while the potential loss in case cash flow turns out to be low is less severe than
without carry forward because the loss can be used to reduce taxable income in the
next period. This is an important benefit because the change to the accelerated method
occurs early in the depreciable life, with little discounting and a high tax base of
assets.
7 Conclusion
The paper extends the literature on optimal tax depreciation by incorporating the
option to negotiate a change of depreciation method. It develops a dynamic program-
ming model to determine the firm’s optimal strategy with regard to the initial choice
of depreciation method, and whether or not to propose changes in later periods. The
optimal choice reflects strategic tax planning to lower the expected discounted future
tax payments. The model is illustrated by numerical examples. The analysis shows
that flexibility of the tax authority with respect to proposed changes creates value for
the firm because it can yield significant reductions in the expected present value of
tax payments. The value of the option to change depreciation method (in terms of
percentage reduction in expected discounted tax payments) depends on the discount
factor, the probability that proposed changes are accepted, and whether or not carry
forward of losses is allowed. Even though the possibility to carry over losses to future
periods reduces expected taxable income, the value of the option to change depreci-
ation method can remain significant. In fact, we find that carry over possibilities can
increase the value of the option to change depreciation method compared to settings
where carry over of losses is not allowed. This occurs because allowing losses to be
carried over may make it optimal to exercise the real option earlier.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 First, it is clear that it is optimal (never suboptimal) to set
ξi,k = 0 in all decision nodes in which a change of method was implemented in a
predecessor node. Indeed, proposing a change then (i.e., setting ξi,k = 1) does not
affect the probability distribution of the resulting depreciation scheme. Moreover, since
changes that are proposed but not accepted do not affect the probability distribution
of the resulting depreciation scheme, it is optimal to set ξi,k = ξi,1 in every decision
node k in which no changes were accepted in prior nodes.
Second, it is seen immediately that the only depreciation schemes that can occur
with non-zero probability are d(M,k), for k = 1, . . . , N , and M ∈ {A, B}.
Now it remains to determine the probability that each of these depreciation schemes
will occur, as well as the probability that a change will be proposed in a given period.
– Depreciation scheme d(M,k) for k < N will result if the following three conditions
are satisfied:
– a change is proposed at the beginning of period k + 1, i.e., ξk+1,1 = 1;
– all prior proposals, if any, were rejected, which occurs with probability
(1 − p)
∑k
j=2 ξ j,1 ; and
– the proposed change in period k + 1 is accepted, which, given that prior pro-
posals were rejected, occurs with probability p.
– Depreciation scheme d(M,N ) results if all proposals to change were rejected, which
occurs with probability (1 − p)
∑N
j=2 ξ j,1 .
This implies that (10) holds true. Next, a change will be proposed in period i iff
ξi,1 = 1, and all prior proposals, if any, were rejected. Therefore, (11) holds true.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose method fM (·, ·) is used in periods j, . . . , i−1, and method
Mc is used in period j − 1. Then, it follows that
d j+k−1 = fM (k, N˜ ) · D˜, k = i − j, . . . , 1,
where N˜ = N − j + 1 denotes the remaining depreciable lifetime of the asset at
the beginning of period j , and D˜ denotes the residual tax base at the beginning of
period j. Then, it holds that:
D˜ = D +
i−1∑
k= j
dk = D +
i− j∑
k=1
fM (k, N˜ ) · D˜.
Therefore, if method M is used in period i , the depreciation charge in that period is
given by:
di = fM (i − j + 1, N˜ ) · D˜
= qi, j,N · D,
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where
qi, j,N = fM (i − j + 1, N − j + 1)
1 − ∑i− jk=1 fM (k, N − j + 1)
.
Note that it follows from (2) that
qN ,·,N = fM (N − j + 1, N − j + 1)
1 − ∑N− jk=1 fM (k, N − j + 1)
= 1.
This concludes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2 Follows immediately from Lemma 1, and the fact that for any given
random variable X with cumulative distribution function F(·), and any d ∈ R, it holds
that
E[(X − d)+] =
∞∫
d
(1 − F(x))dx .
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 At any given period i = 2, . . . , N , the firm decides whether
or not to propose a switch of depreciation method, i.e., whether to stick with method
M (i.e., ξi = 0) or to propose a switch to method Mc (i.e., ξi = 1). For both options,
the present value of future tax payments is given by the sum of expected value of tax
payments in period i , and the expected present value of future tax payments in periods
i + 1, . . . , N .
– If ξi = 0, then method M is used in period i , so that the expected tax payments
in period i are given by T ax(i, M, D), and the residual tax base in period i + 1 is
given by (1−qi,M )D. Because no change was proposed this implies that the value
function in period i + 1 is given by Vi+1(M, (1 − qi,M )D, (ξ i−1, 0), (φi−1, 0)).
– If ξi = 1, with probability pi (ξ i−1, φi−1), the proposal will be accepted, so
that the expected tax payments in period i are given by Tax(i, Mc, D), and the
residual tax base in period i + 1 is given by (1 − qi,Mc )D. Because a change
was proposed and accepted, the value function in period i + 1 is given by
Vi+1(Mc, (1−qi,Mc )D, (ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 1)). With probability 1−pi (ξ i−1, φi−1),
the proposal is not accepted, so that the expected tax payments in period i are given
by Tax(i, M, D), and the residual tax base in period i +1 is given by (1−qi,M )D.
Because a change was proposed but not accepted, the value function in period i +1
is given by Vi+1(M, (1 − qi,M )D, (ξ i−1, 1), (φi−1, 0)).
In period i = 1, both methods are accepted with probability 1, and there is no
proposal to change, so that the expected tax to be paid in period 1 is given by
Tax(1, M, D0), and the value function at date 2 is given by V2(M, (1 − q1,M )D0).
Proof of Proposition 3 Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, M ∈ {A, B}, D ∈ [0, D0], ξ i−1 ∈
{0, 1}i−2, and φi−1 ∈ {0, 1}i−2 be given, and denote Gi (αi ) for the expected benefit
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of proposing a change in period i , given the current method M , the residual tax base
D, and ξ i−1, φi−1. It then follows from Proposition 2 that:
Gi (αi ) = pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) ·
[
Tax(i, M, D) − Tax(i, Mc, D)]
+αi · Si+1(M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1), (18)
where Si+1(M, D, ξ i−1, φi−1) is as defined in (16). It is optimal to propose a change
in period i iff Gi (αi ) > 0. Note that Gi (αi ) is linear in αi , and
Gi (0) = pi (ξ i−1, φi−1) ·
[
Tax(i, M, D) − Tax(i, Mc, D)] .
We now show that i) and ii) are satisfied with α˜i ∈ [0, 1] defined as follows:
α˜i = 1, if  α ∈ [0, 1]s.t.Gi (α) = 0,
= G−1i (0), otherwise.
We distinguish the following two cases:
– If the current method M is the most accelerated method, i.e., qi,M > qi,Mc , then
Gi (0) = pi
∫ qi,Mc D
qi,M D (1 − Fi (x))dx ≤ 0. Therefore,
– If α˜i = 1, then Gi (α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1].
– If α˜i < 1, then Gi (α) < 0 for all α < α˜i and Gi (α) > 0 for all α > α˜i .
Since qi,M > qi,Mc , this implies that the most (least) accelerated method is pref-
erable for α < α˜i (α > α˜i ).
– If the current method M is the least accelerated method, i.e., qi,M < qi,Mc , then
Gi (0) > 0. Therefore,
– If α˜i = 1, then Gi (α) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1].
– If α˜i < 1, then Gi (α) > 0 for all α < α˜i and Gi (α) < 0 for all α > α˜i .
Since qi,M < qi,Mc , this implies that the most (least) accelerated method is pref-
erable for α < α˜i (α > α˜i ).
This concludes the proof.
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